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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the attempted car bombing in New York’s Times Square on May 1, 2010, the decision to read Miranda warnings to the suspect, Faisal Shahzad, ignited a national debate. Republican leaders, such as Senator 
John McCain, denounced the application of Miranda warn-
ings.1 Senator Christopher Bond, the ranking Republican on 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, criticized those who pri-
oritized “protecting the privacy rights of these terrorists” over 
intelligence gathering.2 Representative Peter T. King, the rank-
ing Republican on the House Homeland Security Committee, 
argued that terrorism suspects 
should be deemed enemy com-
batants and “the first preference 
should be a military commis-
sion because you can get more 
information.”3 While some 
conservative commentators, 
such as Glenn Beck, supported 
Miranda rights for U.S. citi-
zens,4 Senator Joseph Lieberman 
called for legislation that would 
deprive Americans of their 
citizenship and related rights 
“when they are apprehended and 
charged with a terrorist act.”5
The Obama administration’s approach to the Shahzad 
controversy evolved over time. Following his inauguration, 
President Obama issued an executive order banning any interro-
gation techniques not already authorized in the U.S. Army Field 
Manual and creating an interagency task force on interrogation.6 
The task force recommended the creation of the High-Value 
Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), a specialized interagency 
group that would be housed within the FBI and subject to the 
oversight of the National Security Council.7 The primary goal 
of the group would be gathering intelligence, as well as, “where 
appropriate, to preserve the option of gathering information to 
be used in potential criminal investigations and prosecutions.”8 
Although members of the HIG assisted with the questioning 
of Faisal Shahzad,9 the task force’s recommendations did not 
reference Miranda rights.10
The White House and Democratic leaders initially 
supported the decision to read Shahzad his Miranda rights, 
as they had done in previous controversies.11 Democrats 
focused on the decision’s practical effects, maintaining that the 
Miranda warnings did not impede law enforcement efforts.12 
Representative Adam Smith explained, “We have proven in 
this country for a long, long time that you can get very valu-
able information out of people after you Mirandize them.”13 
Despite an initially strong stance on Miranda rights, however, 
in May 2010, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. requested 
legislation that would allow investigators greater flexibility to 
interrogate terrorist suspects without informing them of their 
rights.14 In a reference to New 
York v. Quarles, which estab-
lished a public safety exception 
that permits law enforcement 
officials to temporarily interro-
gate suspects without advising 
them of their Miranda rights 
when “reasonably prompted by 
a concern for public safety,”15 
Holder asked that the legislature 
expand the public safety excep-
tion in terrorism-related cases.16
Although the administra-
tion did not produce a proposal 
and no such legislation was 
enacted, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a memo-
randum, dated October 21, 2010, that effectively implemented 
Holder’s suggestions.17 The FBI Memorandum detailed FBI 
policy regarding the use of Miranda warnings for custodial 
interrogations of operational terrorists who have not been 
indicted and are not represented by an attorney.18 In accordance 
with the Quarles public safety exception, it advised agents to 
ask questions that “are reasonably prompted by an immediate 
concern for the safety of the public or the arresting agents” be-
fore administering Miranda warnings.19 The FBI Memorandum 
instructed agents, in exceptional cases, to proceed with con-
tinued unwarned interrogation after exhausting the relevant 
public safety questions when “necessary to collect valuable 
and timely intelligence not related to any immediate threat.”20 
The agents were advised to first consult with supervisors on 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s seminal Miranda v. Arizona 
decision25 was the culmination of a decade’s long struggle 
to define the meaning of an “involuntary” confession. 
The Court’s previous jurisprudence primarily applied a “vol-
untariness doctrine” in the context of the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 The doctrine considered the 
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the defen-
dant’s power of resistance was overcome by an excessively 
coercive interrogation.27 However, there was no “talismanic 
definition of ‘voluntariness,’ mechanically applicable to the 
host of situations where the question has arisen.”28 Rather, the 
Court has considered a multitude of factors, such as the condi-
tion of the suspect, isolation from others, the character of the 
police conduct, and the length of the interrogation.29 As described 
by Steven Penney, the Court’s pre-Miranda jurisprudence 
was uneven and alternatively dominated by three, sometimes 
overlapping, themes: the unreliability of confessions under 
questionable circumstances, deterring abusive police practices, 
and protecting the autonomy of the individual suspect.30
The challenges of the voluntariness doctrine reflected 
the Court’s “internal disagreements concerning the proper 
balancing of the interests of suspect and society.”31 In two 
cases in 1964, the Court began to take a different approach.32 In 
Massiah v. United States33 and Escobedo v. Illinois,34 the Court 
invalidated two confessions under the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel.35 Instead of requiring law enforcement officials to 
refrain from unlawful interrogation practices, the Court imposed 
an affirmative obligation to provide counsel to the suspect.36 The 
majority in Escobedo was clear about the decision’s practical 
effect on law enforcement efforts, stating:
No system worth preserving should have to fear that 
if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he 
will become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the 
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effec-
tiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is 
something very wrong with that system.37
Shortly after the Massiah and Escobedo decisions, the  
Supreme Court again reconsidered its confessions jurisprudence  
in Miranda v. Arizona.38
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court changed course, signaling 
clearer reliance on the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.39 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that a custodial 
interrogation is inherently coercive and thus, “the prosecution 
may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to 
the understanding that “the government’s interest in obtaining 
this intelligence outweighs the disadvantages of proceeding 
with unwarned interrogation,” including the suppression of the 
resulting statements at trial.21
Finally, the FBI Memorandum proposed that “[i]n light 
of the magnitude and complexity of the threat often posed 
by terrorist organizations, particularly international terrorist 
organizations, and the nature of the attacks,” the interrogation 
of an operational terrorist “may warrant significantly more 
extensive public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings 
than would be permissible in an ordinary criminal case.”22
Civil liberties and human rights organizations responded 
with dismay. A coalition of thirty-five organizations sent a 
letter to Holder stating, “[c]urrent law provides ample flexibility 
to protect the public against imminent terrorist threats while 
still permitting the use of statements made by the accused in a 
criminal prosecution.”23 The coalition argued that an expansion 
of the public safety exception “would undercut our fundamental 
Fifth Amendment rights for no perceptible gain.”24
This Article will address the legal foundations of the 
current debate over the Miranda rights of terrorist suspects, 
focusing on the proposed expansion of the Quarles public safety 
exception. Part II will discuss the development of the Miranda 
doctrine, the emergence of the public safety exception, and 
the impact of the Dickerson decision. Part III will address the 
current scope of the public safety exception, including the circuit 
split over the standard for both the factual basis for the concern 
and the immediacy of the threat. Part IV will consider additional 
exceptions to the Miranda doctrine, such as the admissibility 
of derivative evidence, the use of statements for impeachment 
purposes, certain types of overseas interrogations, and the pub-
lic safety exception in the context of the Edwards rule, which 
requires that questioning halt after suspects invoke their right 
to an attorney. In light of these standards, Part V considers the 
application of the current public safety exception to three high 
profile terrorism cases: the 2008 coordinated bombing and 
shooting attacks in Mumbai, the 2009 Christmas day bombing 
attempt of a Detroit-bound airplane, and the 2010 attempted 
car bombing in New York’s Times Square. Finally, Part VI 
returns to Justice Marshall’s dissent in Quarles as support for 
this Article’s conclusion that the public safety exception should 
not be expanded. Where law enforcement officials determine 
that immediate questioning is needed, they may, of course, 
do so; this does not require, however, altering Miranda’s pro-
hibition on the introduction of such statements at any criminal 
trial of the person questioned.
Criminal Law Brief 21
secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”40 These proce-
dural safeguards include warnings of (1) the right to remain 
silent, (2) the possibility that statements can and will be used 
against the suspect in court, (3) the right to confer with counsel 
before answering questions and to have counsel present, and 
(4) the right of indigent suspects to appointed counsel.41 The 
dissenting justices strongly rejected the constitutional basis for 
the decision,42 which held that the scope of “compulsion” under 
the Fifth Amendment is broader than “coercion” prohibited 
under the Due Process Clause, and which imported a right to 
counsel, addressed in the Sixth Amendment, into the Fifth 
Amendment.43 Justice Harlan warned that the decision “entails 
harmful consequences for the country at large,”44 predicting that 
the effect of new warnings would be to “negate all pressure, 
to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to 
discourage any confession at all.”45
B. THE QUARLES PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
While the dissenters in 
Miranda predicted that dire 
consequences would result 
from its strict application,46 the 
Court soon limited its reach 
with a series of exceptions.47 
In Harris v. New York,48 for 
example, the Court allowed the 
use of unwarned statements to 
impeach a defendant.49 Shortly 
thereafter, in Michigan v. 
Tucker,50 the Court held that 
derivative evidence from 
unwarned statements are 
admissible.51 Most notably 
for this discussion, in New 
York v. Quarles, the Court 
created a public safety excep-
tion to Miranda warnings.52
In New York v. Quarles, a young woman told police 
officers that she had been raped and provided a description 
of the rapist, including a statement that the accused had just 
entered a supermarket carrying a gun.53 The officers appre-
hended the defendant in the supermarket and frisked him, 
discovering that his shoulder holster was empty.54 Three officers 
were present, and after handcuffing the defendant, one officer 
asked him where the gun was.55 The defendant nodded towards 
some empty cartons and responded, “[T]he gun is over there.”56 
The officer retrieved a loaded .38-caliber revolver, placed the 
defendant under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights.57 The 
defendant waived his rights, confirmed that he owned the gun, 
and stated the place of purchase.58 At trial, the Supreme Court 
of New York excluded the defendant’s initial statement, “the 
gun is over there,” as well as the gun itself, reasoning that the 
officer had not read the defendant his Miranda warnings.59 The 
trial court also excluded the defendant’s subsequent statements 
as evidence tainted by the prior Miranda violation.60
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the case presented 
a “situation where concern for public safety must be paramount 
to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rule enun-
ciated in Miranda.”61 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
engaged in a balancing test of the rights of the defendant with 
the social cost of Miranda warnings, which he cautioned might 
deter a suspect from responding to police questioning.62 Noting 
that the primary social cost of Miranda warnings is generally 
the possibility of fewer convictions, he argued that here the cost 
would be the failure to obtain information necessary “to insure 
that further danger to the public did not result from the conceal-
ment of the gun in a public area.”63 Thus, the application of the 
Miranda doctrine without exception would
[P]lace officers . . . in the 
untenable position of hav-
ing to consider, often in a 
matter of seconds, whether 
it best serves society for 
them to ask the neces-
sary questions without the 
Miranda warnings and 
render whatever probative 
evidence they uncover in-
admissible, or for them to 
give the warnings in order 
to preserve the admissibil-
ity of evidence they might 
uncover but possibly dam-
age or destroy their ability 
to obtain that evidence and 
neutralize the volatile situ-
ation confronting them.64
Considering these practical effects, the majority concluded 
that absent actual coercion by the officer, there was not a con-
stitutional imperative to exclude evidence resulting from such 
public safety questioning without Miranda warnings.65 The 
Court limited this Miranda exception to situations where law 
enforcement officials are “reasonably prompted by a concern 
for the public safety,”66 and when, distinguishing from Orozco 
v. Texas,67 there is “exigency requiring immediate action 
by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a 
serious crime.”68 The test is objective rather than subjective, and 
the “availability of that exception does not depend upon the 
motivation of the individual officers involved.”69
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall rejected 
the factual assumption that the public was at risk during 
Considering these practical 
effects, the majority concluded 
that absent actual coercion 
by the officer, there was not 
a constitutional imperative to 
exclude evidence resulting from 
such public safety questioning 
without Miranda warnings.
22 Spring 2012
the interrogation, noting that the defendant was unarmed, 
handcuffed, and surrounded by four officers and that the store 
was deserted at the time.70 He also objected to the application 
of a balancing test at all and to the majority’s characterization 
of the Miranda decision.71 Justice Marshall argued that the 
social costs or benefits of Miranda warnings did not inform 
the Miranda decision, which was instead “concerned with the 
proscriptions of the Fifth Amendment.”72 He condemned the 
majority’s “chimerical quest for public safety,” for creating an 
inevitably confusing and controversial exception at the expense 
of the clarity of the Miranda decision.73
Instead, Justice Marshall maintained that public safety could 
be protected without abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment 
rights.74 He stated:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise 
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate 
suspects without advising them of their constitutional 
rights. . . While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits 
on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or 
our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of 
emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids 
is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.75
Justice Marshall conceded that there was a potential cost 
to his approach if a defendant’s incriminating statements were 
excluded and the state had no independent proof of guilt.76 He 
questioned, however, how often such statements would consti-
tute “the crucial and otherwise unprovable element of a criminal 
prosecution.”77 Regardless of the frequency of such incidents, 
he maintained that “their regularity is irrelevant”: the Fifth 
Amendment absolutely prohibits self-incrimination whether or 
not the testimony is compelled to protect public safety.78
The Dickerson Decision and the Future of Post-Miranda 
Jurisprudence
The language in Quarles raised questions about the 
constitutional basis of the Miranda decision—namely whether 
Miranda warnings are themselves constitutionally requisite, 
or are merely “prophylactic” rules protecting constitutional 
rights.79 The public safety exception to the warnings, and 
similar exceptions for impeachment purposes80 and derivative 
evidence,81 seemed to indicate that they were not mandated by 
the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court repeatedly described 
Miranda as a prophylactic decision that “sweeps more broadly 
than the Fifth Amendment itself.”82 In 2000, the Court had the 
opportunity to reconsider its Miranda decision. Two years after 
the Miranda decision, an indignant Congress had responded by 
enacting the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968.83 Section 3501 of the act made all unwarned but volun-
tary statements by criminal suspects admissible in federal court, 
returning to a pre-Miranda totality of the circumstances stan-
dard.84 The statute lay dormant until 1999, when the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit revived Section 3501 to admit 
a criminal defendant’s statement.85 The Fourth Circuit held that 
Section 3501 overruled Miranda as it applied to federal law 
enforcement officers, and thus unwarned confessions that met 
the totality of circumstances test were admissible.86 The Supreme 
Court decided to review the decision and—to the surprise of 
many—reaffirmed the constitutional status of Miranda.87
In Dickerson v. United States,88 a 7-2 majority of the Court 
held that, “Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this 
Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress.”89 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had previously authored several 
opinions describing the warnings as prophylactic,90 “concede[d] 
that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the 
view” that the warnings are not constitutionally requisite.91 
However, he looked to the Court’s consistent application of the 
Miranda requirement to the states over which it has no supervi-
sory power92 and to the principles of stare decisis to ultimately 
determine that Miranda is a constitutional decision that should 
not be overturned.93 Rather, the Miranda warnings had “become 
part of our national culture.”94
In his dissent, Justice Scalia objected to the majority’s 
attempt to reconcile the numerous exceptions to Miranda 
with its decision.95 He argued that, “if confessions procured in 
violation of Miranda are confessions ‘compelled’ in violation 
of the Constitution, the post-Miranda [decisions with excep-
tions] do not make sense.”96 In response, the majority asserted 
the constitutional underpinnings of Miranda, but acknowledged 
its inherent flexibility. Recognizing the exceptions to the rule, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, albeit in dicta, stated:
[N]o constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying 
down a general rule can possibly foresee the various  
circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, 
and the sort of modifications represented by these cases 
[setting out exceptions to Miranda] are as much a nor-
mal part of constitutional law as the original decision.97
The Dickerson decision created some uncertainty as to 
the future of the Miranda exceptions. As Justice Scalia noted, 
the majority never explicitly stated whether Miranda warnings 
are themselves constitutionally required,98 yet the majority’s 
description of Miranda as a “constitutional decision” was at 
odds with the prophylactic line of cases.99 As stated by Professor 
George C. Thomas III, “[i]f Miranda is best understood, in 
light of Dickerson, as constitutional in the strong sense, the 
exceptions and doctrinal limitations made on the authority 
of the prophylactic theory seem doomed.”100 However, the ma-
jority in Dickerson indicated — in dicta, but in dicta that was 
“subscribed to by a formidable majority of seven on the 
Supreme Court”101 — that the status quo would continue de-
spite its internal contradictions.102 That is, Dickerson appeared 
to reaffirm both Miranda and the exceptions to Miranda’s rules 
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that the Court had adopted in its previous cases.103 While the 
Court has not yet revisited this issue, lower courts have con-
tinued to apply the public safety exception after the Dickerson 
decision.104 Thus, it remains likely that, “although Dickerson 
seemingly repudiated the premises on which some Miranda-
debilitating decisions are based, the exceptions to Miranda will 
remain in place.”105
III. CURRENT SCOPE OF THE QUARLES  
PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION
While lower courts have continued to apply the Quarles 
public safety exception in the wake of the Dickerson decision, 
there has been a divergence among the circuits in articulating 
the relevant standards. The Quarles majority limited the public 
safety exception to situations where officials are “reasonably 
prompted by a concern for the public safety,”106 and when there 
is “exigency requiring immediate action by the officers beyond 
the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.”107 The 
Courts of Appeals, however, have differed in their requirements 
of both the factual basis for the concern and the immediacy of the 
threat.108 The magnitude of the threat has not been a significant 
factor in any circuit decision.
A. INHERENTLY DANGEROUS SITUATIONS
The Seventh, Ninth, First, and Eight Circuits have applied 
the Quarles doctrine in inherently dangerous situations even 
when the officers did not have actual knowledge of the presence 
of a weapon, nor a specific reason to believe that the weapon’s 
presence presents a danger to law enforcement officials or the 
general public. For example, in United States v. Edwards,109 
the Seventh Circuit considered an arrest involving known drug 
dealers.110 The defendant and his passengers had been arrested 
on narcotics charges, frisked, and handcuffed at the time an 
officer asked if they had firearms.111 Edwards replied, “What 
do I need a gun for,” since he was en route to a restaurant.112 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the admissibility of his state-
ments, finding that the officers had an “objectively reasonable 
need” to protect themselves “from any immediate danger that 
a weapon would pose” because “drug dealers are known to 
arm themselves.”113
The Eighth Circuit has taken a similar approach in applying 
the public safety exception to inherently dangerous situations. 
In United States v. Williams,114 the defendant was arrested at his 
apartment on narcotics charges.115 After securing the premises, 
the officers handcuffed Williams and asked him, “[I]s there 
anything we need to be aware of?”116 Williams told them that 
there was a gun in a closet.117 The court found that Quarles 
applied because the officers “could not have known if any armed 
individuals were present in the apartment or preparing to enter 
the apartment within a short period of time,” or “whether other 
hazardous weapons were present in the apartment that could 
cause them harm if they happened upon them unexpectedly 
or mishandled them in some way.”118 At the time of the 
questioning, however, the apartment had been secured,119 and 
the only information to support the presence of a weapon was 
the defendant’s status as a narcotics dealer and that he had 
“at one time” been accused of being a fugitive from a charge 
involving use of a weapon.120
The Ninth Circuit has not required actual knowledge 
of a threat or its immediacy. Instead, contrary to Quarles,121 
the court has focused on the motivations of the officers. In 
United States v. Brutzman,122 ten officials executed a search 
warrant related to suspected mail and wire fraud.123 The officers 
asked the defendant if any weapons were on the premises, and 
the defendant admitted there was a shotgun in the closet.124 The 
court focused exclusively on whether the officer’s questions 
“‘arose from his concern with public safety’ and ‘his desire . . . 
‘to obtain evidence of a crime.’”125 Noting the scope of the ques-
tioning,126 and that the presence of a weapon was completely 
unrelated to the charge of mail and wire fraud, the court found 
that the questions had a public safety purpose and fell within 
the Quarles exception.127 The Ninth Circuit did not consider 
whether the officers had actual knowledge of the presence of a 
weapon, or the immediacy of a threat.128 The court has asserted 
that “a pressing need for haste is not essential” in determining 
whether the public safety exception applies.129
The First Circuit similarly ignores the immediacy of the 
threat as a factor. In United States v. Fox,130 the defendant was 
pulled over during a traffic stop.131 The officer recognized 
the defendant from a previous arrest that had included brass 
knuckles and a concealed firearm, and noticed “a large bulge” 
in his coat pocket.132 The officer frisked the defendant, revealing 
brass knuckles and an unused shotgun shell.133 The officer asked 
if there was a gun in the car, which the defendant denied.134 
After the defendant was in the police car, the officer asked 
again about weapons, and the defendant gave their location.135 
The court concluded that the brass knuckles and shotgun shell 
provided actual knowledge of a threat, and found that the officer 
had “ample knowledge to fear for his own safety” to justify 
the Quarles exception even though the officers had secured 
the vehicle.136
These positions have created some division within the 
federal courts. For example, in a concurring opinion, Judge 
Raymond Gruender on the Eighth Circuit took issue with 
the majority’s neglect of the immediacy requirement.137 While 
ultimately concurring with the majority, out of deference to cir-
cuit precedent, Judge Gruender noted that the Quarles majority 
explicitly denounced extending the exception to the mishan-
dling of weapons in its discussion of the Orozco decision.138 
Although Orozco also involved a missing gun,139 the Quarles 
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Court distinguished the case because there was no “exigency 
requiring immediate action by the officers beyond the normal 
need expeditiously to solve a serious crime.”140 Judge Gruender 
suggested that a fair reading of the Quarles opinion would limit 
the exception to situations where “(1) an immediate danger to 
the police officers or the public exists, or (2) when the public 
may later come upon a weapon and thereby create an immedi-
ately dangerous situation.”141 As seen below, this position has 
been adopted by other Courts of Appeals.
B. REASONABLE FACTUAL BASIS AND IMMEDIACY  
 OF THE THREAT
In contrast to the positions of the other circuit courts, the 
Sixth, Tenth, Fourth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have adopted 
a narrower public safety exception to Miranda warnings. As 
summarized by Judge Lynch, the decisions of these courts 
are more likely to rest “on spe-
cific reliable information that 
a weapon was present, and a 
specific reason to think that 
the location of the gun posed a 
concrete danger to the public.”142
The Sixth Circuit has cre-
ated a formal test for applying 
the public safety exception. As 
established in United States v. 
Williams,143 and later adopted 
by the Tenth Circuit,144 the court 
limits the exception to situations 
where an officer has a “reason 
to believe (1) that the defendant 
might have (or recently have had) 
a weapon, and (2) that someone 
other than police might gain 
access to that weapon and inflict 
harm with it.”145 The knowledge 
must be based on “articulable 
fact[s] at [the officer’s] disposal” 
at the time.146 Factors satisfy-
ing the first prong may include 
whether the suspect had a history 
of violence, was involved with drugs, exhibited evidence of a 
weapon, or had recently been seen with a weapon.147 The second 
prong is more difficult to establish because the factual circum-
stances are more limited.148 For example, the court in Williams 
explained that the exception might apply if the defendant were 
unrestrained and heading towards the possible location of a 
weapon.149 If a defendant were handcuffed and out of reach of 
a weapon, however, the officers “plainly could not have had an 
objectively reasonable fear for their safety,” and the exception 
would not apply.150
The Fourth Circuit has taken a similar approach in earlier 
cases. In United States v. Mobley,151 the court considered an 
arrest where agents asked whether “there was anything in the 
apartment that could be of danger to the agents who would be 
staying to conduct the search warrant, such as a weapon.”152 
Since the apartment had been secured and Mobley was the only 
person present besides the agents, the court found that there 
was “no demonstration of an ‘immediate need’ that would 
validate protection under the Quarles exception.”153 Analogous 
to the second prong of the Sixth Circuit’s test in Williams,154 the 
Fourth Circuit held that “[a]bsent other information, a suspicion 
that weapons are present in a particular setting is not enough, 
as a general matter, to demonstrate an objectively reasonable 
concern for immediate danger to police or public.”155 Noting that 
Quarles is “an exception to the Miranda rule,” the court warned 
against applying it in “an ordinary and routine arrest scenario.”156
The Fifth Circuit has ad-
dressed related concerns, limiting 
its application of the public safety 
exception. In United States v. 
Raborn,157 police officers pulled 
over a narcotics suspect.158 The 
defendant stepped out of his truck 
wearing a holstered pistol, which 
an officer saw him remove and 
place inside the truck.159 The offi-
cers, who were unable to find the 
gun, asked the defendant where it 
was located and he stated that it 
was under the seat cover.160 As the 
officers were aware of the pres-
ence of the gun, the court focused 
on the immediacy of the threat.161
Since the officers had seized 
the truck and there was no im-
mediate danger of someone other 
than police gaining access to 
the weapon, the court held that 
the Quarles exception did not 
apply.162 Since the Raborn deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit has firmly 
held that “[w]hen the danger inherent in a confrontation has 
passed, so has the basis for the [public safety] exception.”163
Finally, the Second Circuit requires “sufficient indicia 
supporting an objectively reasonable need to protect the police 
or the public from immediate harm.”164 For example, in United 
States v. Estrada,165 officers executed an arrest warrant for 
a drug dealer with a criminal record that included assault 
convictions.166 After handcuffing the suspect, an officer asked 
about the location of any weapons, and the defendant stated 
that there was a gun in the pocket of a jacket.167 For actual 
There is no doubt that while 
a loaded handgun in a 
crowded supermarket or in the 
possession of an unrestrained 
accomplice may threaten the 
safety to the general public 
or officers on the scene, a 
terrorist in possession of a 
dirty bomb presents a threat  
of a different nature.
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knowledge, the court looked to the defendant’s criminal history, 
which showed that he “was capable of violence,” and his status 
as a drug dealer and concluded that it was a reasonable inference 
that weapons were present in the apartment.168 Regarding im-
mediacy, the court found this existed in the officers’ knowledge 
that an additional person, a co-resident of the apartment, was 
also present during the arrest.169
C. MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT
Since the majority of cases involving a public safety excep-
tion to Miranda involve missing firearms, there has been little 
discussion of whether the magnitude of the threat affects the 
Quarles analysis. Thus, the proposal in the FBI memorandum 
that the public safety exception be expanded based on “the 
magnitude and complexity of the threat often posed by terrorist 
organizations, particularly international terrorist organizations, 
and the nature of their attacks”170 presents a novel argument. 
There is no doubt that while a loaded handgun in a crowded 
supermarket or in the possession of an unrestrained accomplice 
may threaten the safety to the general public or officers on the 
scene, a terrorist in possession of a dirty bomb presents a threat 
of a different nature.
The few cases addressing such scenarios have not explicitly 
taken into consideration the magnitude of the potential threat. 
For example, in United States v. Khalil, discussed in greater de-
tail in Part V, the Second Circuit considered the questioning of 
an accused terrorist with respect to a bomb that was discovered 
in his apartment.171 The court’s discussion of the Quarles excep-
tion was limited to the officer’s questioning of the defendant as 
to whether he intended to kill himself in the bombing, reason-
ing that the defendant’s “vision as to whether or not he would 
survive his attempt to detonate the bomb had the potential for 
shedding light on the bomb’s stability.”172 Since the question-
ing was supported by an objectively reasonable need to protect 
the police and the public from a specific, imminent threat—the 
agents were already in possession of a ticking time bomb—the 
public safety exception applied. As noted later by Judge Lynch 
in Jones, “In Khalil, the exigent risks to public safety were 
more extreme even than in Quarles itself, and the Court made 
clear that the acceptability of the questioning was to be tested 
in light of its relevance to that exigency.”173 Thus, despite the 
interests at stake, the court focused on the nexus between the 
questioning and the specific threat, and did not address whether 
the magnitude of the threat alone justified an expansion to the 
exception.174
The court’s framework may determine the magnitude of the 
potential threat on the court’s reasoning in future cases. Courts 
that apply the Quarles doctrine in inherently dangerous situa-
tions might consider the magnitude of the threat as relevant to 
determining the nature of the situation. For example, courts that 
have relied primarily on the defendant’s status as a known drug 
dealer to apply a public safety exception without knowledge of 
the presence of a weapon or a reason to believe that the weapon 
presents a danger,175 would take a similarly expansive approach 
to a suspect’s status as a known terrorist. In contrast, courts that 
have applied a narrower exception are more likely to continue 
to require both actual knowledge of a specific threat as well as 
a reason to believe that the threat poses an immediate danger 
to the public regardless of its magnitude. Since many of these 
cases, including Khalil, were decided before the September 11, 
2001 attacks,176 however, it remains to be seen whether courts 
will adapt these standards when considering the magnitude of 
the threat in future terrorism cases.
IV. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE  
MIRANDA DOCTRINE
The Quarles public safety exception is one of only several 
other exceptions to the Miranda doctrine. For example, even 
where a statement is excluded from the Government’s case-in-
chief based on improper Miranda warnings, the statement may 
be used for impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies.177 
Additionally, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule for 
Miranda violations,178 and hence any derivative evidence may 
be introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Furthermore, 
Miranda generally does not apply to interrogations conducted 
by foreign officials.179 Finally, if a suspect invokes his Miranda 
rights, a public safety exception may still apply to the result-
ing statements and derivative evidence when there are exigent 
circumstances.180
A. ADMISSIBILITY FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES
A statement that is inadmissible under Miranda may 
nonetheless be introduced to impeach the defendant’s 
testimony.181 Such an exception was seemingly rejected by 
the Miranda Court, which said that the rules applied to all im-
properly obtained statements, including “direct confessions,” 
“statements which amount to ‘admissions’ of part or all of an 
offense,” or “statements alleged to be merely ‘exculpatory.”’182 
The Court noted that allegedly exculpatory statements are often 
used to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial, finding that 
“[t]hese statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense 
of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and 
effective waiver required for any other statement.”183
In 1971, however, the Court established an exception for 
impeachment use of statements taken in violation of Miranda.184 
In Harris v. New York,185 a police officer failed to fulfill the 
Miranda requirements when he failed to warn the suspect he 
had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford coun-
sel.186 At trial, the prosecution conceded that the resulting 
statements were not admissible and made no effort to use them 
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in its case-in-chief.187 The prosecution used the statements 
for impeachment of the defendant, however, and the jury was 
instructed that it should consider these statements “only in 
passing on [the defendant’s] credibility and not as evidence of 
guilt.”188 The Court held that the prosecution’s use of the state-
ment to impeach the defendant’s testimony was permissible.189
Harris was met with controversy at the time,190 nonetheless 
the Court has since reaffirmed its position.191 Justice Marshall 
acknowledged the vitality of the Harris decision in his dissent 
to Quarles, emphasizing the jury instructions that the state-
ment not be considered as evidence of guilt.192 While courts 
have disagreed over impeachment use when law enforcement 
officials deliberately violated the Miranda rule,193 the impeach-
ment exception remains valid.194
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
The Court held, pre-Dickerson, that the failure to give a 
suspect Miranda warnings does not require the suppression 
of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary 
statements.195 For example, the Court permitted the introduc-
tion of testimony from a witness discovered solely because of 
an unwarned statement in Michigan v. Tucker,196 and a written 
confession obtained after Miranda warnings cured a previous 
unwarned interrogation in Oregon v. Elstad.197 Since these 
rulings were based on a prophylactic view of the rules rejected 
in the Dickerson decision, the future of the derivative evidence 
exception seemed unclear immediately after Dickerson, even 
though, Dickerson, in dicta, reaffirmed both Miranda and the 
exceptions to Miranda.198
The Court resolved the confusion over the continued 
legitimacy of the derivative evidence exception in United 
States v. Patane.199 In Patane, an officer attempted to advise the 
defendant of his Miranda rights, but the defendant interrupted, 
asserting that he knew his rights.200 The officer then asked about 
the location of the defendant’s pistol, and retrieved it.201 The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the suppression of the pistol, reasoning 
that Tucker and Elstad were incompatible with the Dickerson 
ruling.202 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Self-
Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the admission into 
evidence of the physical fruit of an unwarned but otherwise 
voluntary statement.203 Adopting a distinction between testimo-
nial and non-testimonial evidence that had been advocated by 
Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion to Quarles,204 the 
Court in Patane held that “‘the word ‘witness’ in the constitu-
tional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause 
to testimonial evidence.”205 Thus, “the exclusion of unwarned 
statements . . . is a complete and sufficient remedy” for Miranda 
violations,206 and the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated 
by the introduction of non-testimonial evidence obtained as a 
result of the statements, including Patane’s pistol.207 The Court 
stated that “nothing in Dickerson, including its characterization 
of Miranda as announcing a constitutional rule,” changed any 
of its observations.208
The ruling in Patane is limited, however, to physical fruit 
of otherwise voluntary statements that were taken without full 
Miranda warnings.209 Significantly for terrorism cases, evidence 
derived from statements made under duress—that is, statements 
that are coerced—is not admissible, prohibited not by Miranda, 
but by the text of the Fifth Amendment itself.210 For example, 
just this year, in United States v. Ghailani,211 a judge in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York had before 
him a defendant charged with supplying the explosives used 
to bomb U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya more than a 
decade ago.212 The defendant alleged that he had suffered physi-
cal and psychological abuse at the hands of his interrogators, 
and the Government asked the court to assume for the purposes 
of the motion that the defendant’s statements while in CIA 
custody were coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment.213 
Judge Kaplan held that the testimony of a witness whom the 
government identified from Ghailani’s statements was not 
admissible.214 In cases where a statement is obtained through 
coercion, the court held, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
use of the statement or any derivative evidence—testimonial or 
non-testimonial—unless the evidence “‘has been come at . . . 
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of 
the primary taint.’”215
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS TO FOREIGN  
 OFFICIALS
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the extrater-
ritorial application of the Miranda doctrine, lower courts 
have held that some form of Miranda warnings is required 
for overseas custodial interrogations conducted by American 
officials,216 albeit with some disagreement over the scope of the 
protections.217 The courts have not, however, applied Miranda 
to overseas interrogations conducted by foreign officials unless 
there was substantial participation by U.S. personnel. But, if 
the interrogation tactics are so severe as to “shock the judicial 
conscience,” the resulting statements are coerced in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible.218
To determine whether there has been substantial par-
ticipation of American officials, courts have applied the joint 
venture doctrine.219 The first prong of the doctrine provides that 
“evidence obtained through activities of foreign officials, 
in which federal agents substantially participated and which 
violated the accused’s Fifth Amendment or Miranda rights, 
must be suppressed in a subsequent trial in the United States.”220 
The second prong prevents U.S. officers from using local agents 
to perform a custodial interrogation “in order to circumvent the 
requirements of Miranda.”221 Demonstrating that the foreign 
officials had their own interest in the matter may satisfy this 
requirement.222
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The precise requirements of the joint venture test remain 
unclear. While the presence of U.S. officials at an interrogation 
is not sufficient unless they participate in some way,223 there is 
not a clear standard for the requisite level of participation. For 
example, in United States v. Abu Ali,224 the Fourth Circuit split 
on whether there was a joint venture.225 Saudi Arabian officials 
had interrogated the defendant using some of the questions 
supplied by U.S. officials.226 Noting that the Saudi interroga-
tors “determined what questions would be asked, determined 
the form of the questions, and set the length of the interroga-
tion,” thus remaining in control of the investigation,227 Judges 
Wilkinson and Traxler were convinced that the American 
officials were not trying to evade the strictures of Miranda.228 
They also argued that a broad 
application of Miranda protections 
would frustrate allies, creating 
an “unwarranted hindrance to 
international cooperation.”229 
In contrast, Judge Motz found 
that providing the questions to 
be asked by cooperating foreign 
officials constituted sufficient 
participation to establish a joint 
venture.230 She cautioned that the 
majority’s view “permits United 
States law enforcement officers 
to strip United States citizens 
abroad of their constitutional 
rights simply by having foreign 
law enforcement officers ask the 
questions.”231
While Miranda warnings 
do not apply to overseas inter-
rogations conducted by foreign 
officials, the resulting statements 
are inadmissible if they have been 
coerced in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause or the Due 
Process Clause. U.S. courts conduct a voluntariness analysis 
to determine whether the defendant’s due process rights have 
been violated.232 When the interrogation tactics were so severe 
as to “shock the judicial conscience,” the court may exclude 
the resulting evidence.233 In very rare cases, coercive interroga-
tions by foreign officials may taint later interrogations by U.S. 
officials, even when they first administer Miranda warnings.234 
Given the standard’s high bar, which is generally limited to 
tactics amounting to torture, and the evidentiary challenges of 
proving acts committed overseas in environments controlled 
by foreign officials, most defendants are unlikely to meet this 
burden. Courts have become increasingly open to the participa-
tion of foreign officials, taking novel steps such as allowing for 
a live, two-way video link for overseas depositions of foreign 
officials.235 The majority of statements taken by foreign officials 
without substantial participation by U.S. personnel are likely to 
be admitted in future cases, even though no Miranda rights were 
given. Again, however, statements that “shock the conscience” 
or otherwise violate the defendant’s due process rights will not 
be admitted, even if obtained from foreign sources.
D. THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION IN THE  
 CONTEXT OF AN EDWARDS VIOLATION
Another possible exception to the Miranda doctrine occurs in 
the context of a violation of the Edwards rule, which requires that 
questioning cease after a suspect invokes his right to counsel.236 
While the Supreme Court has never considered whether the 
public safety exception applies to 
Edwards situations, two courts of 
appeals have determined that the 
Quarles exception applies.237
The Ninth Circuit was the 
first appellate court to determine 
that a public safety exception 
applies to excuse an Edwards 
violation.238 In United States v. 
DeSantis, 239 officers executed an 
arrest warrant at the defendant’s 
apartment.240 DeSantis maintained 
that after he was read his Miranda 
rights, he asked to call his attorney 
and was refused.241 He then asked 
to change his clothes in another 
room.242 The officers asked if 
weapons were present in the room, 
and he told them that there was a 
gun in the closet.243 In address-
ing the defendant’s suppression 
motion, the court faced the question 
of whether “the considerations 
undergirding Quarles necessitate relaxation of certain proce-
dural safeguards enunciated in Edwards v. Arizona.”244 The 
court answered in the affirmative, finding the same consid-
erations in Quarles “that allow the police to dispense with 
providing Miranda warnings in a public-safety situation would 
permit them to dispense with the prophylactic safeguard that 
forbids initiating further questioning of an accused who requests 
counsel.”245 Since the officers were legally entitled to question 
DeSantis about the location of weapons for their own safety, the 
statements and the gun were admissible.246
In United States v. Mobley, the Fourth Circuit confronted 
similar facts.247 FBI agents arrested the defendant at his home 
and “Mobley had answered the door naked, and it was quite 
apparent that he was unarmed.”248 After being advised of his 
Miranda rights, Mobley invoked his right to counsel.249 Agents 
While Miranda warnings 
do not apply to overseas 
interrogations conducted by 
foreign officials, the resulting 
statements are inadmissible 
if they have been coerced 
in violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause or the 
Due Process Clause.
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then asked if there were weapons present, and Mobley admit-
ted that there was a gun in a closet.250 The court denied his 
suppression motion, holding that the public safety exception 
should be extended to Edwards cases.251 The Fourth Circuit, 
however, declined to extend the new exception to the facts 
before it in Mobley, where the defendant had been encoun-
tered naked, the FBI had already made a security sweep of the 
premises, and there were no other individuals present.252 Thus, 
the court found that, although “the public safety exception is a 
valid and completely warranted exception to the Miranda and 
Edwards rules, we are persuaded that there was no demonstra-
tion of an ‘immediate need’ that would validate protection 
under the Quarles exception in this instance.”253
While not specifically addressing this issue, the Supreme 
Court has allowed for other exceptions to the Edwards rule.254 
For example, the Court held in Oregon v. Hass that statements 
made after a suspect invokes his right to counsel may be used to 
impeach contrary trial testimony.255 Although Hass was decided 
before Edwards, the Court has since reaffirmed the impeach-
ment exception. In Michigan v. Harvey,256 the Court stated that 
“Hass was decided 15 years ago, and no new information [that 
an impeachment exception diminishes the deterrent effect of 
excluding the statements from the prosecution’s case-in-chief] 
has come to our attention which should lead us to think other-
wise now.”257 And although rulings extending the Quarles 
exception to the Edwards rule are thus far confined to two 
circuit courts, it appears likely that other courts will find the 
Edwards rule susceptible to public safety arguments.258
V. CASE STUDIES: THE PUBLIC SAFETY  
EXCEPTION AND TERRORISM
A. PIPE BOMBS IN BROOKLYN: ABU MEZER
The Abu Mezer case epitomizes the ticking time bomb 
scenario. In July 1997, Abdelrahman Mossabah was living 
with two roommates, Abu Mezer and Khalil, in an apartment in 
Brooklyn, New York.259 Abu Mezer, who was angered by the 
situation between Israel and Palestine, showed Mossabah pipe 
bombs in the apartment and shared his plans to detonate them 
in a crowded subway or bus terminal.260 Mossabah panicked 
and approached Long Island Rail police, trying to explain what 
he had seen.261 He provided police officers with a key to the 
apartment and a diagram of its layout and the location of the 
bombs.262
In the raid on the apartment, Abu Mezer lunged for the first 
officer and grabbed for his gun, while Khalil crawled toward a 
black bag containing the bombs.263 Officers shot and wounded 
both men, who were handcuffed and taken to the hospital.264 
Technicians examined the black bag and found pipe bombs 
with one of the switches already flipped, and “were concerned 
that the bomb would explode before they could disarm it.”265 
Officers at the hospital asked Abu Mezer a series of questions 
about the make of the bombs and the procedure for disarming 
them, and he answered all of the questions.266 Officers also 
asked him if he planned to kill himself in the explosion, to 
which he responded, “Poof.”267
Later that afternoon, officers read Abu Mezer his Miranda 
rights and he continued to respond to questions.268 He explained 
his motivations for the attack, his associations with terrorist 
organizations, his preparations and plans for the bombing, and 
his hopes for future attacks.269 He also stated that when he real-
ized the police were in his apartment, “he had wanted to blow 
himself up.”270
At trial, the defendant did not question the applicability 
of Quarles, except as applied to his statement in response to 
questioning about whether he intended to kill himself in the 
bombing.271 In a brief discussion, the Second Circuit found that 
Abu Mezer’s “vision as to whether or not he would survive his 
attempt to detonate the bomb had the potential for shedding 
light on the bomb’s stability.”272 The questioning fell within the 
public safety exception and the resulting statement was admis-
sible.273 As noted by Judge Lynch, the Khalil decision did “little 
to test the limits of the Quarles exception,” because “the exigent 
risks to public safety were more extreme even than in Quarles 
itself.”274 He explained that “confronted with a bomb that might 
or might not be about to explode, no rational person could think 
that the police, before questioning the bomb’s maker about its 
characteristics, must advise the bomber in effect that it behooves 
him to consult counsel before answering.”275
B. THE CHRISTMAS DAY BOMBER:  
 UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALLAB
On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
a Nigerian national, was a passenger on a flight from Amsterdam 
to Detroit, Michigan.276 There were 279 passengers and eleven 
crew members.277 Abdulmutallab was carrying a concealed 
bomb designed to allow detonation at the time of his choos-
ing.278 Shortly before landing, he disappeared into the bathroom 
for twenty minutes.279 When he returned, he pulled a blanket 
over himself and passengers then heard popping noises and saw 
his pant leg and part of the wall catch on fire.280 Passengers and 
flight crew intervened, extinguishing the fire and restraining 
him.281 A flight attendant asked Abdulmutallab what was in his 
pocket, and he responded “explosive device.”282 After landing, 
he was taken into custody and received medical treatment.283
Once he was in custody, the FBI questioned Abdulmutallab 
for about fifty minutes without reading his Miranda rights.284 
During questioning, one source said that Abdulmutallab warned 
of other terrorism attacks, stating that, “[o]thers were following 
me.”285 The interrogation lasted until he was taken into surgery 
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for the burns he sustained.286 After surgery, a second team of 
FBI agents reportedly attempted to continue questioning, but 
Abdulmutallab stopped cooperating and, in consultation with 
four government agencies, interrogators read his Miranda 
warnings.287 Days after the attempted bombing, FBI agents trav-
eled to Nigeria and worked to gain the trust of Abdulmutallab’s 
relatives.288 On January 17, 2010, FBI agents returned with two 
family members who conveyed to him that they “had complete 
trust in the U.S. system” and they believed he “would be treated 
fairly.”289 Senior administration officials said that he began 
talking again, and has been cooperating on a daily basis and 
providing actionable intelligence.290
His trial is still in the pre-trial stage, although 
Abdulmutallab, who is representing himself, has inquired about 
the possibility of a guilty plea.291 Given the substantial forensic 
evidence and number of eyewitnesses, the prosecution would 
be unlikely to depend on his statements —either those before 
after the Miranda warnings—at trial. Neither the complaint nor 
the indictment references the statements, referring instead to the 
overwhelming evidence from the scene.292
C. THE TIMES SQUARE BOMBER: FAISAL SHAHZAD
On May 1, 2010, a car was discovered abandoned on 
the street in New York’s Times Square.293 Inside the car were 
“multiple, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertil-
izer — as well as fireworks, clocks, wiring, and other items.”294 
By the time emergency services workers arrived, the vehicle 
was visibly smoking.295 An investigation revealed that Faisal 
Shahzad bought the car, that one of the keys in the vehicle 
opened the door to his residence, and that he used a pre-paid 
cellular telephone to call a fireworks store and receive a series 
of calls from Pakistan after his purchase of the vehicle.296
On May 3, 2010, Shahzad was arrested at the John F. 
Kennedy International Airport.297 After his arrest, joint terror-
ism task force agents and officers from the New York Police 
Department interviewed Shahzad for three or four hours before 
reading him his Miranda rights.298 The Deputy Director of 
the FBI, John S. Pistole, described Shahzad as “cooperative,” 
stating that he provided “valuable intelligence and evidence.”299 
After investigators determined there was not an imminent 
threat, Shahzad was read his Miranda rights and waived 
them.300 He then “continued to cooperate and provide valuable 
information.”301
According to the complaint, after his arrest, Shahzad admitted 
to attempting to detonate a bomb in Times Square, and that 
he had recently received bomb-making training in Waziristan, 
Pakistan.302 The complaint does not state whether he made these 
statements before or after he was read the Miranda warnings,303 
although he could also have reaffirmed the statements after the 
warnings. Hours after his arrest, there were reports of seven 
or eight additional arrests in Pakistan.304 While there were no 
official statements linking the arrests to Shahzad’s statements, 
commentators, such as former Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew 
C. McCarthy, argued that “the information supporting these 
arrests almost certainly came from Shahzad.”305 The govern-
ment’s sentencing memorandum states that after Shahzad 
waived his Miranda rights, he stated, “among other things, that 
he believed his bomb would have killed at least 40 people, and 
that, if he had not been arrested, he planned to detonate a second 
bomb in New York City two weeks later.”306
Shahzad ultimately pled guilty to all ten counts of the 
indictment,307 so the court never ruled on the scope of the public 
safety exception as applied in his case.
VI. CONCLUSION: REVIVING JUSTICE MARSHALL’S 
DISSENT TO QUARLES
Despite the claims that the Quarles public safety exception 
should be expanded, Justice Marshall’s assertion that public safety 
can be protected with abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment 
rights remains valid. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, some commentators predicted that the Miranda could not 
survive in the context of terrorism. William Stuntz cautioned:
Terrorists tend not to be easily cowed or confused; 
they are therefore less likely to agree to talk to the  
police than are average suspects. The consequence  
is that Miranda’s invocation rule, which caused only 
distributive injustice before September 11, risks caus-
ing homicides after that date. Of course, the police 
can prevent that result by ignoring the invocation rule, 
but that has a high price as well: Suspects who maybe 
guilty of terrible crimes may be effectively immune 
from prosecution.308
Thus, Miranda, which had “seemed unshakeable,” may now be “un-
tenable.”309
So far, however, this has not proven to be the case. As seen 
in the examples of Abu Mezer, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
and Faisal Shahzad, some terrorist suspects have willingly 
provided information after, as well as before, receiving Miranda 
warnings.310 Mezer explained to officers how to defuse the pipe 
bombs he had constructed, and continued to provide detailed 
information after hearing his Miranda rights.311 Abdulmutallab 
initially provided information after his arrest.312 While he ceased 
cooperating after his surgery, he resumed under the influence 
of relatives the FBI had flown from Nigeria.313 Shahzad also 
cooperated with authorities and waived his Miranda rights.314 
In fact, since September 11, 2001, federal authorities have 
resolved nearly 700 terrorism-associated prosecutions,315 which 
have included significant numbers of cooperators, informants, 
and guilty pleas.316
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The preexisting legal framework provides sufficient flex-
ibility for successful terrorism investigations, intelligence 
operations, and prosecutions. As argued by Justice Marshall, 
public safety may be protected without creating an exception 
to Miranda or abridging a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.317 
He stated:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise 
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate 
suspects without advising them of their constitutional 
rights. . . . While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits  
on such behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or 
our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of 
emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids 
is the introduction of coerced statements at trial.318
The courts have continu-
ously upheld Justice Marshall’s 
position that a suspect’s Fifth 
Amendment rights are not 
violated by an unwarned inter-
rogation unless the resulting 
statements are introduced at 
trial.319 Furthermore, courts 
recognize that officials conduct 
unwarned interrogations for 
intelligence purposes.320 As 
stated by Judge Sand, “[t]o the 
extent that a suspect’s Miranda 
rights allegedly impede [intel-
ligence] collection, we note that Miranda only prevents an 
unwarned or involuntary statement from being used as evidence 
in a domestic criminal trial; it does not mean that such state-
ments are never to be elicited in the first place.”321
As Justice Marshall recognized, there will be potential 
costs to this approach if excluded incriminating statements 
constitute “the crucial and otherwise unprovable element of a 
criminal prosecution.”322 However, he rightly questioned the 
frequency of such scenarios. In the case studies examined in this 
Article, the Government had sufficient independent evidence 
without the defendants’ incriminating statements. For Abu 
Mezer, the government had the pipe bombs in his bedroom, the 
testimony of his roommate, and his assault on a police officer.323 
Abdulmutallab was literally captured with a smoking bomb on 
his person, and the government had access to an airplane full 
of eyewitnesses.324 Shahzad purchased the vehicle he used as 
a car bomb, one of the keys in the vehicle opened the door 
to his residence, and he placed calls to a fireworks store and 
received a series of calls from Pakistan after his purchase of 
the vehicle.325 While additional incriminating statements would 
certainly have bolstered each case, the efficacy of a prosecution 
is not sufficient to overcome the Fifth Amendment prohibition 
on self-incrimination.
In addition to the public safety exception, the Supreme 
Court has developed numerous other exceptions to the pre-
scriptions of Miranda.326 As described in Part IV, these include 
the admissibility of derivative evidence, the use of statements 
to impeach the defendant, certain types of overseas interroga-
tions, and the public safety exception even where the defendant 
has invoked his Edwards rights. In the case of Faisal Shahzad, 
arguably the weakest in the terms of independent evidence, 
these exceptions could have significantly affected the pros-
ecution. For example, even if his statements were excluded, 
any derivative evidence could have been introduced into the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Shahzad reportedly stated that he 
received bomb-making train-
ing in Waziristan, Pakistan. 
Without introducing this state-
ment, the Government could 
have questioned witnesses who 
accompanied Shahzad on the 
trip or attended the training in 
Pakistan. If Shahzad testified at 
trial, the statements themselves, 
potentially including his admis-
sion of guilt, could be used 
for impeachment purposes. If, 
hypothetically, Shazad had been 
overseas and foreign officials 
had interrogated him there, 
Miranda might not apply at all. And, even if he invoked his 
rights during the interrogation, the public safety exception as 
spelled out by the courts (without any expansion as proposed by 
the Department of Justice [footnote to supra]) might still apply 
to permit admission of his statements.
Nearly thirty years after the Quarles decision, Justice 
Marshall’s opposition to the creation of a public safety 
exception is largely academic. Having survived the Dickerson 
decision, some form of the Quarles public safety exception is 
here to stay. The basic principles Justice Marshall articulated, 
however, cautions against a legislative or judicial expansion of 
the exception in the context of terrorism cases.327 Officers may 
conduct an unwarned interrogation to identify or stop terrorist 
activity when there is not an immediate threat to public safety, 
but the Fifth Amendment requires that the resulting statements 
be inadmissible for prosecution. Prosecutors may avail them-
selves of other evidence as well as the many other exceptions 
to the Miranda doctrine.
I propose that the courts should continue to interpret the 
public safety exception within the confines of reasonableness 
and exigency as articulated in the Quarles decision. In the con-
text of terrorism, a public safety exception based on the inherent 
The preexisting legal framework 
provides sufficient flexibility 
for successful terrorism 
investigations, intelligence 
operations, and prosecutions.
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dangerousness of the situation could well render Miranda rights 
meaningless—making Quarles the “narrow exception” that 
swallows the rule in terrorist trials. Even the broader interpre-
tations of the exception by the courts have limited the scope 
and duration of the inquiry. The exception does not grant law 
enforcement officials “an automatic right to interrogate sus-
pects” without Miranda warnings simply because it is possible 
that terrorism is involved.328 Rather, at a minimum, when the 
authorities are “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public 
safety,”329 and when there is “exigency requiring immediate ac-
tion by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to 
solve a serious crime,”330 there should be a factual basis for both 
the specific concern and the immediacy of the threat. The public 
safety exception should remain within the limits envisioned by 
the Quarles court: a narrow exception “circumscribed to by the 
[public safety] exigency which justifies it.”331
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